Topos of threat and metapolitics in Russia’s securitisation of NATO post-Crimea
Anni Roth Hjermann and Julie Wilhelmsen discusses the key points from their new Review of International Studies (RIS) article. If you'd like to know more you can read the full article at - Topos of threat and metapolitics in Russia’s securitisation of NATO post-Crimea
How do ambiguous linguistic resources shape self-other securitisation processes over time, and do they soothe or create anxiety? The article introduces two concepts that help answer these questions. First, topos of threat denotes a linguistic construction serving as a flexible but condensed self/other threat narrative. Second, metapolitics is a conspiratorial mode of interpretation against a specific adversary, a practice of dismissing any ambiguous appearances of the other as disguised hostility. The article develops these concepts by expanding on existing theoretical insights from securitisation theory (ST) and ontological security studies (OSS), and by theorising from our empirical analysis of Russia’s discursive securitisation of NATO in the five years after annexing Crimea. We show the workings of ‘colour revolution’ as a Russian topos of threat and how it is combined with metapolitics to the effect of entrenching a sense of all-pervasive hostility from NATO.
We suggest that a topos of threat (TT) is a potent linguistic anchor in securitisation processes – a shared rhetorical resource centrally placed in the discursive landscape, which conjures up a complete image of a threatening other and a threatened self, positioned in a particularly significant experience that calls for escape. In the rhetoric of the Russian security elite, ‘colour revolution’ is an example of a TT. It denotes the weaponisation of popular protest and regime change by Russia’s adversaries with the aim of weakening Russia geopolitically. When used in the Russian context, this single term thus evokes an entire self/other threat situation of a hostile and powerful West threatening Russia both militarily and politically, andcalls for escaping this dangerous situation.
A TT derives its clout not only from its central place in a given rhetorical topography but also from the significance and direction it bestows on political communities. For Russia, the TT ‘colour revolution’ answers existential questions like ‘who are we, what have we experienced, and what should we do?’, defining Russia as a victim of aggressive western policies of containment and expansion. This TT also plays to and gives meaning to Russian experiences of domestic challenges and international isolation. Furthermore, TTs are also potent because they are sufficiently ambiguous to incorporate new events and to legitimate diverse forms of political action.
The flip side of this flexibility is that the repeated use of such ambivalent threat constructions sutures the official discourse with ambiguity, creating a pervasive sense of danger. Thus, we argue that while the stand-alone invocation of a TT alleviates anxiety by naming the threat, over time TTs perform threat conflations that reinforce anxiety. Based on our empirical analysis, we argue that the long-term nurturing of TTs has conflating effects on the structural level of discourse, merging actors, actions, past/present, geographical locations, and war/peace. In the Russian case, ‘colour revolution’ comes to signify the western other as a monolithic, everywhere and ever-present adversary; a constant but insidious threat to Russia.
Based on our empirical analysis we propose that to mediate the anxiety stemming from this vague but omnipresent threat, the Russian leadership engages in metapolitics. We theorise metapolitics as a mode of interpretation similar to conspiracy theorising: a relentless analysis of surface clues to expose a deceptive, powerful adversary. For example, Russia’s threat rhetoric on NATO constantly refers to western ‘pretexts’ like democracy and liberal values as a smokescreen for the ‘real’ western project, namely hostile geopolitical expansion. Similarly, Russia refers to a western ‘two-track’ approach towards Russia: a diplomatic track serving as a cover-up for the ‘real’ track of military aggression. Russia collects and interprets ‘clues’ in the behaviour of NATO/the West that ‘prove’ the ultimately hostile goals of its adversary.
Introducing these concepts, we build on and advance the scholarly understanding of the relationship between self/other securitisation, ambiguous threat constructions and anxiety as developed at the intersection between securitisation theory (ST) and ontological security studies (OSS). We suggest that while TTs provide an instant soothing of anxiety, the blurring effect they have over time construes the other as an omnipresent and insidious threat, thereby increasing uncertainty and anxiety. Some actors, such as Russia, turn to metapolitics to mediate the anxiety of their own making. However, metapolitics – the a priori dismissal of the securitised other’s ‘appearances’ – fails to alleviate anxiety in the final event. The combined use of TTs and metapolitics that we observe in the Russian case therefore produces a deterministic bias: we show how the Kremlin leadership became entrapped in their own rhetoric on NATO hostility.
The article concludes with a warning: the rhetorical strategy of relying on both TTs and metapolitics increases the risk of entrapment in a rhetoric that paves the way for armed conflict. While the use of TTs is widespread and tends to deepen the securitisation of self versus other, TTs’ openness retains a potential for change in the self-other relationship. By contrast, adding metapolitics radically reduces self versus other openness and precludes desecuritisation. The Russian case illustrates how the dual rhetorical deployment of TT and metapolitics fosters the interpretational hubris of knowing hybridity: of ‘knowing’ the hostile intentions behind the adversary’s ambiguous behaviour.
In this sense, Russia’s aggressive war unleashed in 2022 is viewed not as a break, but a breakthrough of Russia’s construction of the NATO threat since 2014, anchored in the TT ‘colour revolution’. Combined with metapolitics, Russia’s systematic TT deployment precluded de-securitisation of the NATO threat in Ukraine and fostered Russia’s hubris of knowing NATO as essentially hostile behind its Janus face.
Want to know more? You can read the full article at DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210524000937
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